We consider the Kyle-Back model for insider trading, with the difference that the classical Brownian motion noise of the noise traders is replaced by the noise of a fractional Brownian motion B H with Hurst parameter H > 1 2 (when H = 1 2 , B H coincides with the classical Brownian motion). Heuristically, for H > 1 2 this means that the noise traders has some "memory", in the sense that any increment from time t on has a positive correlation with its value at t. (In other words, the noise trading is a persistent stochastic process). It also means that the paths of the noise trading process are more regular than in the classical Brownian motion case. We obtain an equation for the optimal (relative) trading intensity for the insider in this setting, and we show that when H → 1 2 the solution converges to the solution in the classical case. Finally, we discuss how the size of the Hurst coefficient H influences the optimal performance and portfolio of the insider.
Introduction
In their seminal papers Kyle [6] and subsequently Back [2] formulate and study an equilibrium model for insider trading. There are many papers followed Kyle-Back inspired models that should be cited. The paper most closely related to ours in setup and method is [1] , where a (classical) Brownian motion model is studied. Here we review then briefly the Kyle-Back model, based on the presentation in [1] . We assume the financial market has three agents:
• (ii) The noise traders, who trade randomly without any information about the market.
The portfolio z t of the noise traders is assumed to have the form
where σ t is a given continuous deterministic function and B t = B t (ω), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t } t∈[0,T ] , P). It is assumed thatṽ is independent of the Brownian motion B t , t ∈ [0, T ].
• (ii) The market makers, who at any time t can observe the total traded volume (1.2) y t = x t + z t , but not the separate trades x t , z t . Based on the information (filtration) F y t , t ∈ [0, T ], generated by the observations y s , s ≤ t, the market makers set the price of the stock at time t equal to (1.3)
The wealth w t at time t of the insider can be expressed as (1.4) w t = w 0 + t 0 x s dp s , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
A priori this is an anticipative stochastic integral, which needs further explanation. If we assume, as Kyle and Back , that the strategy of the insider has the form (1.5) dx t = (ṽ − p t )β t dt for some deterministic continuous function β t > 0, called the insider trading intensity, then a natural interpretation of (1.4) is obtained by using integration by parts, as follows:
Alternatively, one might obtain (1.6) by interpreting the stochastic integral in (1.4) as a forward integral. See [8] for definitions and [1] for applications of forward integrals to finance. The insider tries to find the trading intensity β t which maximizes the expected terminal wealth
. In other words, we study how the introduction of persistence or memory among the noise traders influences the KyleBack model, in particular what effect it has on the optimal insider portfolio and maximal expected insider wealth. As in the Kyle-Back setting, we assume thatṽ is independent of B H t , t ∈ [0, T ]. We prove that if an optimal smooth insider trading intensity β exists, then it is the solution of a non-linear integro-differential equation. Moreover, we show that p T =ṽ in Theorem 2.4. In the formulation adopted in this paper, we have encountered a new stochastic differential equations
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the above equation have not been studied yet. In Section 2 we shall formulate our problem, obtain an existence result for the above equation by using the innovation technique, and find an equation that the maximum trading intensity must satisfy. In Section 3, we study the uniqueness of the above equation. In Section 4, we discuss the impact of long memory on the insider trader. The Appendix provide some technical results.
The main result
We use the same setup as in Section 1, except that B t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is replaced with a fractional Brownian motion B . Thus the portfolio of the noise traders gets the form (2.1)
the portfolio of the insider is as before
where p t is the market price at time t set by the market makers, which will be made more precise in next lines (see equation (2.4) below). The total traded volume is hence (2.3)
If we let F y t , t ∈ [0, T ], be the filtration generated by y s , s ≤ t, then it is assumed that (2.4)
Substituting this into (2.3) we get that the total traded volume process must satisfy the equation
As in [1] we will prove that it is possible to find a solution of (2.5) by regarding y t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , as the innovation processỹ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , of an auxiliary linear filtering problem, where the signal process is
and the observation process is
The innovation process for this problem is, by definition,
where Fŷ t = σ(ŷ s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) is the information filtration generated byŷ. It is obvious that we can assume that
We shall show thatỹ solves (2.5). This follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that
Proof. Since
we see that Fỹ t ⊂ Fŷ t . We need to prove the other inclusion Fŷ t ⊂ Fỹ t . First we shall compute p t := E ṽ|Fŷ t by using the result obtained in [5] . Define (2.10)
Then from Theorem 1 of [5] , we know that y * t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a semimartingale and the information filtrations generated by y * andŷ are the same:
We also have
Put (2.14)
and define (which is p(s, 0) of (13) in [5] )
Then by Section 5.1 of [5] we have
for some constant γ 0 = 0 and
From the definition of p t we have p 0 = E [ṽ|F 0 ] = E(ṽ) = 0 since we assume E(ṽ) = 0. Thus we have
For any smooth deterministic function f t , t ∈ [0, T ), we now consider
where we have used the Fubini type theorem in (2.20). We want to find a representation of y in terms ofỹ. This is equivalent to find a solution of the equation
By classical results on Volterra equations, see e.g. [4] 
Remark 2.3. In view of Corollary 2.2 we choose to represent the total traded volume process y byỹ, and we write y instead ofỹ from now on. Note however, that we have not proved that the solution of (2.5) is unique, so this choice is not totally justified from a mathematical point of view, since there might be solutions y of (2. and hence dy t = dỹ t , even without hypothesis (2.9). So from a modeling point of view the assumption that y t =ỹ t is natural, and we will base our study on this.
As shown in the introduction the expected terminal wealth of the insider can be expressed as follows:
We need to compute
We have
We first compute E(p T p t ). By (1.3) we have that p t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a square-integrable martingale. Hence
and consequently
First let us maximize
We do this by using a perturbation argument, as in [1] . Let ε be an arbitrary small number and ξ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be an arbitrary smooth function. We want to compute d dε ε=0 J 0 (β + εξ). In the following we assume that all functions involved are smooth enough to exchange the order of derivation and integration. We first note that by the definition (2.15) of ρ we obtain
We apply this result to compute γ t (β + εξ) = −2γ
Putting everything together we obtain
Since ξ r is arbitrary, we have (2.30)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus we have proved that if
is maximal, then γ t (β) satisfies (2.31). In particular, γ T (β) = 0. But this implies that γ t (β) is also optimal for (2.33)
since we always have γ T (β) ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. We have proved Theorem 2.4. Suppose β is an optimal insider portfolio for the problem
Then γ T (β) = 0 and γ t (β) satisfies equation (2.31). In particular, by (2.26)
Proposition 2.5. The process y defined by
is an H t := σ ṽ, B H s ; s ≤ t -adapted solution of the equation
Proof. That y defined by (2.36) is a solution of equation (2.37) follows from Lemma 2.1.
We now let H → Proof. First of all we note that by (2.10) K H (s, r) converges to 1 for H → 
Therefore, γ satisfies
Hence for t > r we have that
Substituting (2.41) into (2.39), we obtain
This is equation (2.38).
Uniqueness of the equation
The equation (2.5) which we reproduce here
with y 0 = 0 is a new type of equation even in the case B H is replaced by a Brownian motion, where B H is a fractional Brownian motion of Hurst parameter H, β t and σ t are deterministic functions andṽ is a standard normal random variable independent of the fractional Brownian motion B H . Lemma 2.1 yields the existence of a solution. In Remark 2.3, we explain from economic point of view the rationale of uniqueness. However, mathematically the uniqueness is still an open problem mathematically. It is our conjecture that the uniqueness holds as well. Here we give an attempt to this problem. We restrict the solution to the form
for some unknown functions h 1 (t) and h 2 (t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Sinceṽ and y t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , are jointly Gaussian, there is a g(t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , such that (because E(ṽ) = 0 and
By the property of conditional expectation we have
On the other hand, we have
where
Thus equation (3.4) becomes
Substituting (3.3) into (3.1), we have
Comparing (3.7) with (3.2) and using the fact thatṽ and B H t are independent, we have
Thus we obtain Proposition 3.1. The equation (3.1) has a unique solution of the form (3.2) if the following system of equations has a unique solution (h 1 (t), h 2 (t, s), g(t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ):
The existence of the above system was obtained in Section 2 through the technique of filtering.
The impact of memory (persistence) in the noise trades
One of the motivations of this paper is to investigate how the memory (persistence) and regularity of the noise process of the noise traders, represented by the Hurst coefficient
, influence the performance of the insider. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve our general equation (2.31 ) to obtain the optimal β t = β t (H), t ∈ [0, T ], explicitly, and thus we are unable to make any conclusion about this influence in general. However, if we restrict ourselves to constant insider trading intensity β = β(H) > 0, our equations simplify as follows. Consider σ constant. By (5.1) in Lemma 5.1 we obtain that
Therefore equation (2.16) becomes
where a H := Γ(
. Hence, we can write down the performance functional as
It is easy to see that for a given H ∈ ( , 1). They also show that the optimal insider trading intensity β * (H) decreases with increasing
, 1). These results can perhaps be understood as follows. Increasing the Hurst coefficient H of the noise trading reduces the "complexity" of the noise in two ways: (i) the noise process becomes more persistent, and (ii) the paths of the noise process become more regular. Both these effects contribute to the decrease of the information advantage of the insider, because with reduced noise the actions of the insider become more apparent to the market makers. Thus increasing H might have the same effect on the insider performance as reducing the noise level |σ| in the classical Brownian motion model (H = 1 2 ). Similarly, the decrease of the optimal trading intensity β * (H) with increasing H, is also in line with what happens when |σ| decreases in the classical setting. (See Section 1). It is not clear, though, what the effects of increasing H would be if the portfolios β were allowed to vary with time.Then the insider might be able to take advantage of the increased "predictability" of the noise traders to increase her performance, and this might outweigh the disadvantage coming from reduced noise complexity mentioned above. In either case, we have not been able to give rigorous proofs of any of these statements regarding the effects of increasing H, and we leave the task of doing so as an open problem.
Appendix
In this appendix we provided some technical computations needed in the previous sections. 
